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Key Points
•  Amid one of the deepest crises of confidence since the end of the Cold 
War, arms control and military confidence-building frameworks are 
struggling to develop their full de-escalating and trust-building potential.
•  In fact, numerous crisis situations in the past show that the findings 
of national verification procedures are particularly prone to the risk of 
serious political disputes and, in the worst case, can sometimes even 
become the source of additional tensions and distrust.
•  While clearly not alone able to resolve the deep crisis in European 
security, lessons learned from other international organisations suggest 
that giving the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE) the power and resources to conduct verification procedures on 
behalf of its participating States could make an important contribution 
towards a more resilient European arms control and military confidence-
building framework in times of increased political tensions and distrust.
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Introduction
The 2014 crisis in and around Ukraine and the deterioration in Western-
Russian relations that followed have substantially altered the European 
security environment. Increasing numbers of large military exercises, new 
types of armaments, and an increasing focus on deterrence seem to have 
become the new status quo on both sides. In the past, a tight network 
of arms control agreements and military confidence-building measures 
under the framework of the Organization for Security and Co-operation 
in Europe (OSCE) has been able to mitigate the risk of unintended 
military escalation in Europe and contributed to the development of trust 
between former political and military adversaries. Nevertheless, since 
most regimes primarily rely on national verification procedures, they are 
particularly prone to the risk of serious disagreements about verification 
findings and the compliance of other actors. As previous crises in Europe 
and not least the more recent deterioration in Western-Russian relations 
have shown, this is particularly true during times of increased political 
tensions and distrust. In other words, especially when arms control and 
military confidence-building measures are most needed, they appear to 
be unable to develop their full stabilising and trust-building potential in 
European defence and security politics.
Therefore, based on lessons learned from the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical 
Weapons (OPCW), it is worthwhile exploring how a stronger role for the 
OSCE in arms control verification systems and procedures might help 
to facilitate cooperation between states in times of increased political 
tensions and distrust.
The case for a multilateral arms control 
verification system
‘Verification’ is a central component in most arms control agreements. While 
various definitions exist, verification is generally understood as the collecting 
of information about other actors’ compliance with agreed provisions and 
treaty obligations.1 In general, it is possible to distinguish among:
•  observations, usually following the invitation of an actor to verify a 
country’s compliance with an agreement;
•  inspections that allow actors to verify samples of exchanged 
information under an agreement, which can either take the form of 
regular evaluation visits or short-notice challenge inspections (e.g. in 
cases of suspected non-compliance);
•  monitoring, i.e. the continuous observation of another party’s 
compliance (e.g. through technical means); and
•  risk reduction measures, which are meant to collect and verify 
additional information in situations that carry the severe risk of military 
escalation (e.g. emerging crisis situations, unusual military activities, 
communication failures, etc.). Such measures can take the form of 
fact-finding missions (if a situation is still ongoing) or investigations 
(after an incident or situation has occurred).2 
While the main goal of verification is to build trust by verifying 
compliance, both sides can have considerable incentives to misrepresent 
or withhold relevant information in order to obtain a strategic advantage.3 
This problem seems particularly prevalent in situations of increased 
political tensions and distrust, in which strong incentives exist to obscure 
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possible cases of non-compliance or discredit verification findings. 
Sometimes even inspecting states might see a strategic advantage in 
withholding or misrepresenting the outcome of verification measures, for 
example, in order to cross-check them with other sources, to (secretly) 
prepare and take countermeasures, or to increase diplomatic pressure 
and isolate a political opponent internationally. Given this dilemma, it 
seems unsurprising that arms control and military confidence-building 
agreements frequently experience significant stress in times of increased 
political tensions and distrust.
In light of these problems, while political discussions often focus solely 
on making verification measures more intrusive, there is a widespread 
understanding among scholars that no verification system – no matter 
how intrusive – will ever be able to provide absolute certainty.4 This is not 
to say that verification does not serve an important function in deterring 
or detecting possible cases of non-compliance early on,5 but room for 
interpretation will always remain, requiring at least a minimum level of 
trust between the actors involved.6 To address this problem, multilateral 
verification – understood as a formalised form of verification that is either 
facilitated or conducted by an impartial third party (e.g. another state 
or an international body) on behalf of parties to an agreement – offers a 
promising alternative.
Firstly, an impartial third party has fewer incentives to fail to collect, 
withhold or misrepresent verification findings, which allows for a more 
intrusive verification regime that makes it harder to obfuscate possible 
cases of non-compliance. 
Secondly, the information gathered through a multilateral verification 
process also has more authoritative power than verification findings that 
are solely gathered by the conflicting parties. In fact, while individual 
actors might still decide to challenge a verification mission’s findings, 
such behaviour allows other actors to draw conclusions about a country’s 
willingness to resolve the situation with more certainty than a purely 
bilateral approach to verification would allow them to do. In other words, 
even if its findings are dismissed, a multilateral verification procedure is 
nonetheless able to exercise a stabilising function in situations of mutual 
tensions and distrust.
In sum, by offering a more impartial source of information and bringing 
more clarity to actors’ commitment to resolving emerging crisis situations, 
multilateral verification is generally better than bilateral approaches 
during times of increased political tensions and distrust.
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Lessons learned from existing forms of 
multilateral arms control verification 
Internationally, precedents for multilateral verification procedures can be 
found in various arms control regimes. Two of the most prominent ones 
are the IAEA and OPCW. An examination of the work of both organisations 
can produce valuable insights and help to identify practical limitations 
and lessons learned that could lead to a stronger OSCE role in European 
arms control verification activities.
IAEA safeguards
IAEA safeguards are a unique system of bilateral and multilateral 
legally binding agreements that states enter into with the IAEA. These 
agreements task the agency with the verification and monitoring of a 
state’s legal obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and 
other relevant agreements (e.g. those establishing nuclear-weapons-free 
zones) that aim to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and ensure the 
peaceful use of nuclear materials.7 To fulfil these tasks, IAEA safeguards 
mainly rely on three types of verification:
•  ad hoc and routine inspections, which are used to verify the 
information provided by states through regular reports;
• special inspections, in suspected cases of non-compliance; and
•  monitoring, including through technical means, such as surveillance 
cameras, satellite images or environmental sampling.8
As long as a respective safeguards agreement or additional protocol is 
in place, the IAEA and its inspectors are given extensive legal rights and 
able to conduct verification activities largely at their own discretion.9 An 
additional authorisation of these activities is not necessary. Over the years 
limited precedents even exist for the conduct of inspections in fragile 
or conflict-affected regions and situations, such as the 2005 inspection 
of a nuclear research institute in the Georgian breakaway region of 
Abkhazia.10 However, the IAEA cannot enforce its verification activities, 
but is dependent on the cooperation of states parties and the authority 
provided by the international community, most importantly through the 
UN Security Council (UNSC) and General Assembly (UNGA).11
The assessment of a state’s compliance with its obligations under the 
safeguards agreement is fully at the discretion of the IAEA. Only the overall 
conclusions are reported, while the information on which the reports are 
based remains confidential.12 In cases of documented non-compliance 
or the obstruction of IAEA verification activities, the IAEA directly reports 
to the IAEA Board of Governors, the UNSC and the UNGA,13 which then 
decide on an adequate response and possible corrective action (e.g. UNSC 
Resolution 1695 on North Korea or Resolution 1929 on Iran)14. While free 
to make their own judgements, most states generally rely on the IAEA’s 
independent assessments of a particular set of circumstances.
The IAEA’s extensive verification activities consume significant resources. 
In 2018 the Agency conducted 2,195 safeguards inspections15 and its 
verification activities cost about EUR 139 million.16 In addition, to carry out 
its mandate the agency employs about 385 designated inspectors from 
around 80 countries.17






in place, the 
IAEA and its 
inspectors are 
given extensive 
legal rights and 
able to conduct 
verification 
activities largely 
at their own 
discretion.
STRATEGIC SECURITY ANALYSIS STRENGTHENING THE ROLE OF THE OSCE IN TIMES OF INCREASED TENSIONS  
AND EMERGING CRISIS SITUATIONS: THE UNTAPPED POTENTIAL IN THE EUROPEAN ARMS CONTROL FRAMEWORK
7
OPCW
The OPCW was established as an intergovernmental body and 
independent organisation to implement and monitor states’ obligations 
in terms of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) prohibiting the 
production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons. To this end, the 
OPCW’s Verification and Inspectorate Division carries out three types of 
verification activities:
•  routine inspections, including the monitoring by technical means of 
declared sites and the information provided by states parties;
• challenge inspections in suspected cases of non-compliance; and
• investigations of the alleged use of chemical weapons.18
The OPCW and its verification activities obtain their authority directly 
from the CWC, which specifies the legal framework for and rights of 
OPCW inspectors.19 While the OPCW largely plans and conducts its routine 
inspections at its own discretion, states parties are also able to request 
challenge inspections in suspected cases of non-compliance and the 
alleged use of chemical weapons. Such requests are first submitted 
to the Director-General and the Executive Council of the OPCW, which 
consists of 41 member states elected for two-year terms. If deemed 
abusive, the Executive Council can overrule the request within 12 hours 
by a three-quarters majority.20 In recent years the OPCW has also gained 
significant experience of carrying out inspections and investigations in 
fragile and conflict-affected environments, such as in the securing and 
destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles during the civil conflicts in 
Libya and Syria, as well as through a number of fact-finding missions and 
the OPCW-UN Joint Investigative Mechanism on alleged uses of chemical 
weapons in the Syrian civil war.21 Like the IAEA, the OPCW depends in 
such contexts on the cooperation of the countries in question or the 
additional authority provided by the relevant UNSC resolutions.22
Unlike the IAEA, the OPCW does not make judgements on the compliance 
of individual states parties, but reports its findings to the Executive Council 
and the Conference of the States Parties, which oversee the implementation 
of the CWC.23 Both bodies also have the authority to reach conclusions about 
the compliance of individual states, to take corrective action, or to forward 
findings of severe violations to the UNSC and UNGA.24 While the Executive 
Council and the annual Conference of the States Parties try to reach their 
decisions by consensus, decisions might also be passed by a two-thirds 
majority after a 24-hour period of deferment has elapsed.25
To fulfil its mandate the OPCW relies on the assistance of certified 
inspectors and laboratories for its work,26 and is dependent on a 
significant amount of financial resources. In 2018 the OPCW conducted 297 
inspections and its overall verification activities amounted to nearly EUR 
28 million.27
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Summary of verification activities
The surveying of existing multilateral verification procedures under the 
umbrellas of the IAEA and OPCW offers a number of important and 
relevant insights into the question of how an international body can be 
tasked with the multilateral verification of international arms control 
agreements and equipped to do so.
Table 1. Lessons learned from the multilateral verification 
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As these findings highlight, in order to fulfil their verification requirements, 
either independently or at the request of other states parties, the IAEA 
and OPCW are granted extensive legal rights and have been equipped with 
significant human and technical resources. In addition, the experiences 
of both organisations highlight that there are precedents for multilateral 
verification activities in fragile and conflict-affected areas such as 
Abkhazia, Libya or Syria. However, to carry out their verification activities, 
both organisations depend on the cooperation of states parties and the 
authority provided by UNSC and UNGA resolutions.
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Strengthening the role of the OSCE in 
times of increased tensions and emerging 
crisis situations
Based on the experiences of and lessons learned from the IAEA and 
OPCW, it appears worthwhile to explore how to strengthen the role of 
the OSCE in European arms control processes. Considering that existing 
regimes are prone to serious disruptions and disagreements over 
verification findings and compliance, and are ill-equipped to respond to 
emerging crisis situations, the greatest added value might be generated 
by equipping the OSCE to conduct fact-finding missions and carry out 
investigations on behalf of its participating States. For example, under 
the current provisions of Chapter III of the Vienna Document of 2011 
(see Figure 1), a state that expresses its concerns about the activities 
of another participating State can only request a clarification of these 
activities, while a procedure to verify the response provided is not 
foreseen. Also, the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office (CiO), who is supposed to 
mediate if the concerns persist, has no access to any other information 
than that provided by both parties. Thus, to tackle this lack of impartial 
information it seems desirable to equip the OSCE with an independent 
verification procedure in the form of a fact-finding mission, as well as 
the power to conduct investigations on behalf of OSCE participating 
states. This need is also recognised in a number of proposals for ways to 
modernise the OSCE submitted by participating states.
Figure 1. The current Vienna Document risk reduction mechanism, 2011
Concerns persist
1. Request for clarification of military activities of concern
2. Reply by the state allegedly carrying out these activities
3. Meeting chaired by the CiO
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While a general agreement on the benefits of an impartial source 
of information to dispel concerns during emerging crisis situations 
appears to exist, the procedures by which such a fact-finding mission 
or investigation might be authorised and deployed remain contested. 
Usually the OSCE passes decisions by consensus. This would, of course, 
increase the political liability and legitimacy of OSCE verification activities 
and allow states to demonstrate their commitment to dispelling existing 
concerns. However, reaching consensus can be a difficult and time-
consuming political process, particularly in times of increased political 
tensions and distrust. Therefore, a stricter decision-making mechanism 
(e.g. simple majority, consensus-minus-1, silence procedure, etc.) or 
granting the OSCE more independent decision-making authority would 
be desirable. Similarly to the structure and procedures of the IAEA 
and OPCW, this could, for example, be achieved by putting the OSCE 
Secretary-General or a ‘to-be-appointed’ special representative in charge 
of such missions. Steps of this kind would make the mechanism more 
impartial and consequently less vulnerable to political deadlocks. Also, 
the signing of specific bilateral agreements between participating states 
and the OSCE, analogous to the IAEA safeguards provisions, could be 
considered. As has been highlighted above, even though a fact-finding 
mission or investigation cannot be carried out without the explicit 
consent of the inspected state, the refusal to allow an impartial OSCE 
mission to carry out an inspection represents an important finding in 
itself, and can be used to increase the diplomatic and public pressure on 
the state in question. In addition, should a state refuse to cooperate with 
the OSCE, possible consequences (e.g. additional transparency measures 
and constraints on military activities or the deployment of specific 
weapons systems in the area) could even be discussed.
After completion of the fact-finding mission or investigation, the 
OSCE should as quickly as possible compile and submit a report to 
participating States summarising the main findings of the mission. If 
deemed necessary, such a report could even propose additional steps 
towards a further de-escalation of the situation, for example by drawing 
from the list of ‘Regional Measures’ contained in Chapter X of the Vienna 
Document or as stipulated by the document on ‘Stabilizing Measures for 
Localized Crisis Situations’. These proposals and the findings of the report 
could then be discussed in a joint meeting of the Forum for Security Co-
operation and the Permanent Council of the OSCE.
Reaching 
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Figure 2. Possible procedures for a fact-finding mission or investigation 
conducted by the OSCE.
Concerns persist
1. Request for clarification of military activities of concern
2. Reply by the state allegedly carrying out these activities
3. Meeting chaired  
by the OSCE
4. Request by the OSCE or participating 
states to conduct an OSCE  
fact-finding mission or investigation
7. OSCE compiles a report on the mission’s findings that reflects  
the opinion of all observers and makes recommendations  
for additional steps to further de-escalate the situation
8. Joint meeting by the Forum for Security Co-operation and Permanent Council
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To carry out such fact-finding missions and investigations on behalf of 
participating States, the OSCE would need to be equipped with adequate 
financial, personnel and technical resources. While the numbers of 
verification activities and costs are expected to be considerably lower 
than for the IAEA or OPCW, which are also responsible for carrying out 
routine inspections on behalf of states parties, a less cost-intensive 
solution would be to compile teams for fact-finding missions and 
investigations from a list of inspectors made available by participating 
States. Following the positive experiences of the OSCE Special Monitoring 
Mission to Ukraine and considering the increasingly complex nature 
of conflict and crisis scenarios, teams of military inspectors could be 
complemented by civilian observers and experts from other policy areas 
(e.g. policing, infrastructure, human rights, etc.). In addition, implementing 
the examples of the IAEA and OPCW, the OSCE could also be allowed 
to draw on validated and certified technical assets (e.g. surveillance 
cameras, drones, or satellite images) to prepare and carry out its 
verification activities. In the short term a good place for coordinating 
OSCE verification efforts could be the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, 
which would create synergies with existing institutional expertise and 
information gathered by OSCE field missions and across all OSCE security 
dimensions. In the long term, OSCE participating states could even 
consider the establishment of a fully fledged OSCE Verification Centre 
that would take over even more verification activities. However, while the 
idea of an all-European verification institution has already been discussed 
in the course of the 1973 Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions talks,28 
such an institution would probably not only pose difficult legal challenges, 
but also mean a considerable increase in the OSCE budget. Also, it 
remains to be seen to what extent participating States would actually be 
willing to transfer their national verification prerogatives to a multilateral 
OSCE-based verification centre. Still, multilateral verification at the 
OSCE could still serve as an important supplement to their own national 
verification capacities.
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Conclusions
Multilateral verification and a stronger role for the OSCE in arms control 
verification activities are clearly not alone able to resolve the many 
disputes and the deep crisis affecting European arms control systems. 
The challenges that European arms control agreements are confronted 
with are too manifold and complex. Too little has been achieved over the 
last decades by efforts to reinvigorate substantial OSCE modernisation 
debates. However, a thoroughly designed multilateral verification 
mechanism could make an important contribution towards the increased 
resilience of the European arms control system in times of increased 
political tensions and distrust, and should therefore be a part of such 
debates. Based on the experiences drawn from existing forms of 
multilateral verification such as the IAEA and OPCW, and incorporating 
existing ideas from OSCE participating States, this paper suggests that 
the following steps should be taken: 
•  Firstly, the OSCE should be given the power to deploy fact-finding 
missions and conduct investigations in situations that carry a serious 
risk of military escalation (e.g. emerging crisis situations, unusual 
military activities, close military encounters, communication failures, 
etc.). The findings of these missions should be reported to all OSCE 
participating states and, if necessary, should propose additional 
measures to further de-escalate the crisis (e.g. additional measures to 
increase transparency, confidence-building or restraint).
•  Secondly, a stricter mechanism should be designed to dispatch 
OSCE fact-finding missions and investigations (e.g. simple majority, 
consensus-minus-1, silence procedure, etc.).
•  Thirdly, a special representative for risk reduction should be put in 
charge of OSCE verification activities and mediation efforts between 
conflicting parties.
•  Finally, a permanent roster of (military and non-military) verification 
personnel should be established, and the OSCE Conflict Prevention 
Centre should be given adequate financial, personnel and technical 
resources that would allow the safe and rapid implementation of OSCE 
verification activities.
While some of these proposals would certainly result in additional 
costs or might need to be first tested in a more cooperative political 
environment, the experiences drawn from existing multilateral verification 
approaches suggest that the value added by a stronger role for the OSCE 
in fact-finding and verification efforts during emerging crisis situations 
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